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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1963, in Gideon v. Wainright,1 the United States Supreme 
Court established the constitutional mandate that all indigent 
defendants charged with a felony should be provided a lawyer at 
government expense, regardless of whether that defendant was 
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 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
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charged in state court or federal court.2  In the years that followed, 
the United States Supreme Court expanded the constitutional right 
to a lawyer to include: juvenile delinquency cases,3 misdemeanors,4 
first appeals,5 in person line-ups,6 and cases involving suspended jail 
sentences.7  The Court also expanded the states’ obligation to pay 
for nonattorney resources necessary to protect the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.8 While the courts have expanded the right to 
 
 2. Prior to Gideon, several states provided indigent defendants with 
government paid lawyers in capital and noncapital serious felony cases.  See Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477–79 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (listing the thirty-five 
states which recognized the right to a government provided lawyer, either by 
statute, judicial decision, established practice, or state constitution). 
 3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (noting that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution required that in a 
proceeding where a juvenile could potentially be committed to an institution, “the 
child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by 
counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will 
be appointed to represent that child”). 
 4. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (recognizing that “the 
problems associated with misdemeanors and petty offenses often require the 
presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial,” the Court held that “no 
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, 
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”); see 
also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (reiterating that “any 
amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance”). 
 5. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (noting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is violated “where the 
rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into 
the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while 
the indigent . . . has only the right to a meaningless ritual”). 
 6. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967). 
 7. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (noting that a defendant is 
entitled to counsel on a case where he received a suspended sentence); cf. Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (noting that no constitutional right to a lawyer exists if 
the sole sentence imposed is a fine). 
 8. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (noting that “fundamental 
fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present their 
claims fairly within the adversary system’” (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 
612 (1974))).  Furthermore, “justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of 
his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a 
judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”  Id. at 76.  Moreover, the court 
stated that: 
mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a 
proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal 
trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an 
indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to 
the raw materials integral to the building of an effective 
defense.  
Id. at 77. 
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counsel, they have provided no guidance to states on how to deliver 
indigent defense or how to pay for indigent defense. 
It is here that the state and local governments have failed to 
live up to their obligations.  Nearly half a century after Gideon, 
indigent defense remains in a state of crisis.9  Indigent defense is 
woefully underfunded.10  Lawyers providing indigent defense are 
overwhelmed with case volume and complexity, and often struggle 
to devote the time, energy, and resources each case deserves,11 even 
in times of economic prosperity.  During the economic downturns 
 
 9. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (noting “[b]y every 
measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense 
function for poor people is drastically underfinanced”); Norman Lefstein, In 
Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 835, 838 (2004) (“[F]orty years after Gideon, this nation is still 
struggling to implement the right to counsel in state criminal and juvenile 
proceedings.”); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 1 
(2004) (noting that “forty years after the Gideon decision, the promise of equal 
justice for the poor remains unfulfilled in this county”) [hereinafter GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE]; Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts 
for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1809 n.14 (2000) (discussing articles 
ranging from 1967 through 1993 detailing the problems with indigent defense 
due to inadequate funding); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The 
Indigent Defense Crisis is Chronic, 9  CRIM. JUST. 13 (1994) (discussing the impact of 
charging more cases while providing less resources for indigent defense); Penny J. 
White, Mourning and Celebrating Gideon’s Fortieth, 72 UMKC L. REV. 515, 516 
(2003) (noting that “every major study that had been conducted from the late 
1970s through the late 1980s concluded that the right to counsel remained largely 
unfulfilled”); Editorial, Hard Times and the Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
2008 (noting that as a result of “state revenue in free fall, the problem [of 
underfunded indigent defense] is reaching crisis proportions and creating a legal 
and moral challenge for the criminal justice system, state legislatures, and the legal 
profession”); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4, 50 (2009) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED], available at http://www.constitutionproject.org
/manage/file/139.pdf. 
 10. See Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that in 1990 
spending on indigent defense was still less than one-third of that spent on 
prosecution); see also, infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text; White, supra note 
9, at 516 (noting that in 1979 combined state and local government spending on 
indigent defense was about one-quarter of what was spent on prosecution); BILL 
WHITEHURST, A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION #110, at 1, 2 (2004) 
(noting the “woefully inadequate” funding for indigent defense and accurately 
predicting that the funding crises will worsen after 2004 given state budget 
deficits), available at www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense
/rec110.pdf.  
 11. See infra notes 111–140 and accompanying text. 
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in the early 1990s, early 2000s, and the past couple of years, 
funding for indigent defense has been repeatedly slashed.12 
As United States Attorney General Eric Holder noted in early 
2010: 
[P]ublic defender programs are too many times under-
funded.  Too often, defenders carry huge caseloads that 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their 
legal and ethical responsibilities to their clients.  Lawyers 
buried under these caseloads often can’t interview their 
client properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact 
investigations, or spare the time needed to ask and apply 
for additional grant funding. . . .  
 I continue to believe that if our fellow citizens knew 
about the extent of this problem, they would be as 
troubled as you and I.  Public education about this issue is 
critical.  For when equal justice is denied, we all lose. . . . 
Although they may stand on different sides of an 
argument, the prosecution and the defense can, and 
must, share the same objective: Not victory, but justice.  
Otherwise, we are left to wonder if justice is truly being 
done, and left to wonder if our faith in ourselves and in 
our systems is misplaced. 
 But problems in our criminal defense system aren’t just 
morally untenable.  They’re also economically 
unsustainable.  Every taxpayer should be seriously 
concerned about the systematic costs of inadequate 
defense for the poor.  When the justice system fails to get 
it right the first time, we all pay, often for years, for new 
filings, retrials, and appeals.  Poor systems of defense do 
not make economic sense. 
 So, where do we go from here?13 
 
 12. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at n.38 (discussing the impact of a 
sixteen percent reduction in public defense budgets in Oregon for 2001–03); 
Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 13 (listing significant budget cuts in New 
Jersey and Tennessee in 1991 and 1992); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 7 (noting 
the “country’s current financial crisis, which afflicts state and local governments 
everywhere, is having severe adverse consequences for the funding of indigent 
defense services, which already receives substantially less financial support 
compared to prosecution and law enforcement.”); see also infra notes 86–106 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice Nat'l Symposium on 
Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010), 
available at  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/Speeches/Eric%20Holder
%20Remarks%20Indigent%20Defense%20Summit%202.18.10%201.pdf . 
4
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This article attempts to answer that question. 
Part I lays out the evolution of the constitutional right to a 
lawyer provided at government expense.  Although the courts have 
been willing to expand the circumstances in which an indigent 
defendant gets free legal representation, they have been reluctant 
to define what “legal representation” entails.  Furthermore, they 
have deferred to state legislatures to define how legal services are 
provided and the manner in which state governments fund these 
services. 
Part II examines how state legislatures have responded to the 
lack of guidance by the courts.  Part II.A. looks at the various ways 
of delivering legal services to indigent defendants.  Part II.B. notes 
the various funding mechanisms used at the state and local levels to 
pay for these services.  Part II.C. examines caseloads and highlights 
the fact that, despite the significant increase in spending on 
indigent defense, state and local governments have failed in their 
obligation to fully provide indigent defense. 
Part III examines the history of indigent defense in Minnesota, 
the financial problems experienced, and the attempts to generate 
the revenue necessary to provide indigent defense.  It also 
examines how the legislature dealt with public defense during 
budget crunches.  Many of the strategies employed nationwide 
have been used in Minnesota with little or no success.  It is clear 
that no matter what the intentions, the priority to fully fund 
indigent defense does not exist. 
Part IV lays out an alternative dedicated funding stream, which 
would generate sufficient revenue in Minnesota to fully realize 
Gideon’s mandate.  At the same time, the dedicated revenue stream 
would insulate indigent defense from budget cuts enacted during 
times of economic crisis.  This funding stream would rely upon a 
tax on alcohol as a means to meet the mandate of adequate 
indigent defense.  The relationship between alcohol and crime is 
examined, and much of the money allocated for the criminal 
justice system would come from the people who often participate in 
the criminal justice system. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIGENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In 1932 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to 
counsel in Powell v. Alabama.14  In Powell, several African American 
defendants were accused of raping two white girls.15  They were 
indicted seven days after the alleged incident, and within six days of 
indictment, began trial.16  Although it appears that members of the 
local bar expressed a willingness to help in the representation of 
the defendants, no investigation was conducted, and it appears the 
defense was “pro forma [rather] than zealous and active.”17  The 
trials for each of the defendants were each completed in less than a 
single day, each of the defendants were convicted, and each 
defendant was sentenced to death.18  As such, the Court concluded 
that there was no meaningful representation in this case.19 After 
examining the historical right to counsel in the original thirteen 
states, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the right to 
have an attorney appointed was “a logical corollary from the 
constitutional right to be heard by counsel.”20  Furthermore, the 
Court concluded that this obligation was imposed upon the states 
by due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.21  However, at that time the Court limited the right to 
 
 14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 15. Id. at 49. 
 16. Id. at 53. 
 17. Id. at 58. 
 18. Id. at 50. 
 19. Id. at 58 (noting that to conclude otherwise would be to ignore reality). 
 20. Id. at 72.  In recognizing the need for representation, Justice Sutherland 
noted:  
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.  
If charged with [a] crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial 
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or 
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both 
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though 
he [may] have a perfect one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against him.  Without it, though he [may] 
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not 
know how to establish his innocence. 
  Id. at 68–69. 
 21. Id. at 71–72 (applying the obligation on states because “there are certain 
immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government 
6
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appointed counsel to capital cases where “the necessity of counsel 
was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make 
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due 
process . . . .”22 
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court was asked to extend 
the constitutional guarantee of counsel to all felonies in Betts v. 
Brady.23  In that case, the defendant, Mr. Betts, was charged with 
robbery in the state of Maryland.24  Betts asked the court to appoint 
a lawyer for him, but was instructed that the practice was to only 
appoint lawyers in cases involving murder or rape.25  As a result, 
Betts served as his own lawyer.  He was convicted at trial and 
sentenced to serve eight years in prison.26 
As in Powell, the Court in Betts examined the practice of the 
states to determine the scope of the fundamental right to an 
attorney.27  Specifically, the Court examined whether the right to 
counsel meant access to counsel of one’s choice versus access to 
counsel regardless of financial means.28  The Court concluded that, 
in a majority of states, appointment of counsel is not a fundamental 
right essential to a fair trial.29  As a result, the Court declined to 
adopt a bright line rule requiring the appointment of counsel in all 
cases.30  Rather, in a six-three decision, the Court warned that 
convictions arising out of cases where the defendant is 
unrepresented may not stand if the trial “is offensive to the 
 
which no member of the Union may disregard” (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 
U.S. 366, 389 (1898))).   
 22. Id. at 71.  The Court specifically limited its ruling to  
a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is 
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, 
feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, 
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an 
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the 
giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.  
Id. 
 23. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 24. Id. at 456. 
 25. Id. at 457. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 465–71. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 471. 
 30. Id. at 473.  The Court specifically noted “we cannot say that the 
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for 
any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a 
defendant who is not represented by counsel.”  Id. 
7
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common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right . . . .”31 
Twenty-one years later, the United States Supreme Court 
revisited the issue in Gideon v. Wainright.32  In that case, the 
defendant was charged with felony burglary.33  As in Betts, the 
defendant, Mr. Gideon, asked the trial court to appoint him a 
lawyer, and that request was denied.34 Gideon represented himself 
at trial, was convicted, and was sentenced to five years in prison.35  
Justice Black, writing for the majority, noted: 
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person 
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.  
This seems to us be to an obvious truth.  Governments, 
both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of 
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of 
crime.  Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed 
essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly 
society.  Similarly, there are few defendants charged with 
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they 
can get to prepare and present their defenses.  That 
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants 
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the 
strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers 
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. . . . From 
 
 31. Id.  Three justices dissented.  Justice Black, writing for the dissent, noted, 
“If this case had come to us from a federal court, it is clear we should have to 
reverse it, because the Sixth Amendment makes the right to counsel in criminal 
cases inviolable by the federal government.  I believe that the Fourteenth 
Amendment made the sixth applicable to the states.”  Id. at 474 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted).  He went on to note that:  
A practice cannot be reconciled with "common and fundamental ideas of 
fairness and right," which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of 
conviction merely because of their poverty.  Whether a man is innocent 
cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here, denial of counsel 
has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of 
[certainty], that the defendant’s case was adequately presented.  
Id. at 476.  Noting that thirty-five states provide counsel in some form for capital 
and serious noncapital cases, Justice Black concluded his dissent with his stated 
belief that “no man shall be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty.  
Any other practice seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to 
provide equal justice under the law.”  Id. at 477 (footnote omitted). 
 32. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 33. Id. at 336–37. 
 34. Id. at 337 (the noting that, under Florida law, indigent defendants only 
received appointed counsel in capital cases, trial court apologetically denied Mr. 
Gideon’s request). 
 35. Id.  
8
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the very beginning, our state and national constitutions 
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before 
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal 
before the law.  This noble ideal cannot be realized if the 
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers 
without a lawyer to assist him.36 
As such, the United States Supreme Court overruled Betts37 and 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so fundamental 
that the Fourteenth Amendment makes it obligatory on the states.38 
In the aftermath of Gideon, the Supreme Court continued to 
review and expand the right to counsel to the point where if an 
indigent defendant risks spending any time incarcerated, then he 
or she is entitled to a lawyer.39  However, the Court has consistently 
deferred the manner in which indigent services are provided and 
funded to the individual state legislatures.40  When asked to require 
increased resources for indigent defendants, the courts have 
consistently held that funding is specifically the responsibility of the 
legislature.41 
 
 36. Id. at 344.  Justice Black’s words proved to be prophetic.  On remand, Mr. 
Gideon was represented by a local attorney, who conducted extensive 
investigation, effectively cross-examined the witnesses, and essentially established 
that the state’s eyewitness was the likely culprit.  The end result was that Mr. 
Gideon was acquitted by a jury after an hour of deliberations.   JUSTICE DENIED, 
supra note 9, at 21 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 234–50 (1964)). 
 37. See id. at 342. 
 38. Id. at 345. 
 39. See supra text accompanying notes 3–7. 
 40. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS 1 
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender
/downloads/state_indigentdefense_feb07.pdf [hereinafter STATE INDIGENT 
DEFENSE COMMISSIONS] (noting that the Supreme Court has never ruled who is 
responsible to establish and fund indigent defense, and as such the duty has been 
met by the state, local governments, or a combination of both); JUSTICE DENIED, 
supra note 9, at 5.  
 41. See Bill Meyer, Public Defender Offices Are in Crisis Nationwide, 
CLEVELAND.COM (June 3, 2009, 7:02 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/nation
/index.ssf/2009/06/nationwide_public_defender_off.html (noting that an 
appellate court in Florida overturned an order allowing public defenders to 
decline to take new cases on the grounds that solutions are within the province of 
the legislature and the lawsuit was “nothing more than a political question 
masquerading as a lawsuit”); see also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d. 1374, 1381–84 (Ariz. 
1984) (finding low-bid indigent defense contracts unconstitutional, but not 
requiring an alternative means of providing indigent services or minimum costs 
for future contracts); In Re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So.2d. 
1130, 1138–39 (Fla. 1990) (recommending the Florida legislature provide 
additional funds for criminal defense); State v. Citizen, 898 So.2d. 325, 338–39 
9
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III. STATE RESPONSES TO GIDEON AND ITS PROGENY 
A. The Delivery of Services to Indigent Defendants 
Over the years, delivery of indigent defense has developed into 
three categories: (1) public defender programs;42 (2) a contract 
system;43 and (3) assigned counsel.44  Each state was allowed to 
develop its own system for the delivery of services, resulting in a 
“‘crazy quilt’ in which the quality of representation depended not 
only upon the state, but perhaps even, the county of the 
 
(La. 2005) (noting that while the state had taken some actions in the twelve years 
since the Peart decision, it was still not providing sufficient funds for indigent 
defense, but ruling that the appropriate remedy was to put the criminal case on 
hold rather than compel the state or the parish to provide additional funds); State 
v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 783 (La. 1993) (holding that case loads in the New 
Orleans indigent defense system were so high that clients were not provided 
assistance of counsel as constitutionally required, but not requiring any 
governmental agency to provide additional resources); Lavelle v. Justices in the 
Hampden Super. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895, 911 (Mass. 2004) (noting that the 
Massachusetts legislature underfunded indigent defense, but declining to order 
additional money, and instead ordering that cases against defendants would be 
dismissed without prejudice if they did not receive an appointed lawyer within 
forty-five days of being charged); Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) 
(upholding Minnesota’s funding mechanisms for indigent defense even though 
the Fourth Judicial District’s public defender’s office was so understaffed that it 
would need to increase its staff by fifty percent simply to meet state guidelines for 
maximum caseloads); Quitman v. Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005) 
(upholding lower court’s granting of summary judgment on the grounds that the 
county did not establish that state law putting the burden on the county for the 
funding of indigent defense created ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the 
high case loads and lack of support resources available for the public defenders). 
 42. A public defender program is a program where full or part-time public 
defenders provide legal services for a given location or jurisdiction.  Robert L. 
Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of 
Counsel: Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW  & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 
36 (1995). 
 43. A contract system is one where a government entity enters into a contract 
with individuals or firms to provide legal representation for indigent defendants.  
Contracts can be fixed price contracts (a set fee to handle all cases during a set 
time period) or fee-per-case contracts (payment of a set amount for each case 
handled during the time period).  Id. at 35–36. 
 44. Assigned counsel programs rely upon appointment of private lawyers to 
individual cases.  Attorneys may be assigned by judge on an ad hoc basis or by an 
administrative body.  Under either method, payment may be hourly or a set 
amount, although there are often caps on payment.  Id. at 32–34; ABA CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SECTION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE 
SERVICES 5-2 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards
/providingdefense.pdf. 
10
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prosecution.”45  By 1983, public defender offices provided indigent 
defense in just over one-third of the counties nationwide.46  Fifty-
two percent of the counties used assigned counsel programs, and 
the balance relied upon contract systems.47 
By the early 1990s, assigned counsel remained the 
predominant system for the delivery of indigent defense, although 
there had been some increase at the county level in public 
defender offices and contract programs.48  The primary change 
during this decade was the expansion of statewide indigent defense 
programs.49  Statewide programs were responsible for some or all of 
the following: developing policy, providing oversight of indigent 
defense programs, integrating public defender programs, 
developing caseload standards, and dispersing money for indigent 
defense.50  By the early 1990s, more than half the states instituted 
some form of statewide program.51  The growth of statewide 
programs continued in the following decade, and as of 2005, some 
form of statewide body overseeing indigent defense existed in forty-
one states.52 
 
 
 45. White, supra note 9, at 533.  
 46. Id. at 531–32 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BULLETIN: CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 1986, at 3 (1998)). 
 47. Id. at 531 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BULLETIN: CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 1986, at 3 (1998)).  
 48. Id. at 532 (citing Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 42, at 33).  
 49. See White, supra note 9, at 534–35. 
 50. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 16.  For a more 
detailed description of the responsibilities of statewide commissions, see id. at 18–
29. 
 51. White, supra note 9, at 532.  These statewide programs either involved a 
state public defender with authority for providing indigent defense statewide or a 
statewide public defender system run by a commission instead of a public 
defender.  Id. (citing Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 42, at 37–38). 
 52. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 2.  Nine states 
added statewide bodies in the 1980s, five additional states added statewide bodies 
in the 1990s, and seven states added statewide programs between 2000 and 2005.  
Id. at 3.  One state, Mississippi, did disband its statewide program one year after 
creating it, partly because the legislature never provided any funding for the 
program.  THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2005, 17 (2006) [hereinafter STATE AND 
COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005], available at www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid
/defender/downloads/FINAL_REPORT_FY_2005_Expenditure_Report.pdf.  In 
addition, Tennessee created a limited statewide commission, dealing only with 
post-conviction relief.  Local public defenders are elected at the district court level 
and operate without any state oversight.   STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, 
supra note 40, at 2. 
11
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Just as there is great variance from state to state regarding the 
delivery of indigent defense services, there is also great variance 
within the statewide indigent defense programs.  Some variances 
include supervisory authority, funding control, or a combination of 
both, depending upon the specific wishes of each state’s legislature. 
Eleven states have established statewide commissions that 
administer statewide public defense systems, including both 
supervision and funding.53  Nine states have a statewide public 
defender system without a commission.54  Five states have a 
statewide commission that finances the entirety of indigent 
defense, but allows counties or regions to determine the method by 
which legal services are provided.55  Ten states have a statewide 
commission which provides only a portion of the finances for 
indigent defense, but the counties retain primary responsibility for 
the delivery of legal services, as well as the remaining financial 
responsibility.56  Finally, there are five states where the statewide 
bodies have no statutory authority over local jurisdictions and the 
 
 53. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 6.  These states 
are: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin.  Id.  
 54. Id.  These states are: Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id.  In these states, a chief 
public defender is appointed by the governor and is personally responsible for the 
oversight and administration of the state public defender system.  Id. 
 55. Id.  These states are: Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oregon, and Virginia.  Id.  However, even with these categories there are 
significant variations.  For example, in Massachusetts, there is a hybrid system 
where cases are handled both by full time public defenders in regional offices and 
approximately 2400 private attorneys who get appointed to individual cases.  STATE 
AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 15.  All of these lawyers are 
supervised by the statewide body.  Id.    In North Carolina, by contrast, individual 
counties still determine the model for the delivery of services, with thirteen of the 
state’s one hundred counties using a public defender system, while the remaining 
counties rely upon either assigned counsel or contract defenders.  Id. at 23.  
 56. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 7.  These states 
are: Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Texas.  Id.  The partial authority is often over a type of case.  
For example, in Georgia, the state commission has authority over felony and 
juvenile delinquency cases, but counties retain responsibility for misdemeanor 
cases.  Id.  In Kansas, the state is responsible for felonies and appeals, and the 
counties are responsible for misdemeanor and juvenile cases.  Id.  Partial 
responsibility can also be divided by geographic location.  For example, in 
Oklahoma, the state authority covers the entire state, except for the two largest 
counties, who have chosen to opt out of the state system.  Id. at 7–8.  In Nevada, 
seven counties are covered by the state system, but the remaining nine, including 
the two most populous, have opted out of the system and chosen to provided their 
own systems, at their own costs, but without state oversight.  Id. at 8. 
12
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delivery of services, but try to exercise some control through the 
administration of supplemental state funding for indigent 
defense.57  
B. State and Local Funding for Indigent Defense 
The effect of Gideon and its progeny is that the United States 
Supreme Court has created an unfunded mandate that has fallen 
on the shoulders of state and local governments.58  The result of 
this constitutional mandate, without adequate funding, leaves 
indigent defense overwhelmed and undermines the principle of 
equal justice for all. 
 
 57. Id.  These states are: Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas.  Id.  
In all but Texas, compliance with the state authority is discretionary, but to get the 
supplemental funding, local jurisdictions must agree to state standards.  Id.  
However, due to budget limitations, the state funding often amounts to only a 
small portion of total expenses incurred for indigent defense.  Id.  For example, in 
Louisiana, state funding amounted to only 29% of the total spent on indigent 
defense.  Id. at 9.  In Nebraska, the original goal of 25% was never appropriated, 
and in 2004, state spending was only 4% of the total spent on indigent defense.  Id. 
at 9–10.  In Texas, state funding was 11% of the total costs.  Id.  Ohio, which once 
provided almost half the total costs, saw its contributions drop below 30%.  Id. 
 58. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 29–30 (citing Norman Leftsein, In Search 
of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 835, 843 (2004)).  Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Argersinger, 
raised concerns about the financial impact of expanding the right to counsel, 
noting:  
[T]he easiest solution would be a prophylactic rule that would require 
the appointment of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases.  The 
simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be applied 
automatically in every case, but the price of pursuing this easy course could be 
high indeed in terms of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal 
justice systems. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 50–51 (1972) (emphasis added).  Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority, dismissed Justice Powell’s concern, indicating 
that there were sufficient legal resources in the United States to meet the 
expanded need for counsel.  Id. at 37 n.7.  Justice Douglas noted that it would take 
between 1575 and 2300 full time lawyers to provide legal representation to the 
expanded class of misdemeanor defendants, a small number of the estimated 
355,200 lawyers practicing in the United States in 1972.  Id.  Justice Brennan, in a 
concurring opinion, opined that law students in clinical programs would be able 
to “make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the 
representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today’s 
decision.”  Id. at 44.  The only discussion about the financial cost being imposed 
upon the states was by Justice Powell, who concluded his concurrence by noting 
that courts and legislatures in individual states established limits for the 
appointment of counsel, and that by extending the right to counsel to all 
misdemeanors, the Court’s decision “may seriously overtax capabilities.”  Id. at 60.   
13
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By 1972, nine years after Gideon, and the year the right to 
counsel was extended to misdemeanors, nationwide indigent 
defense expenditures were estimated at $87 million annually.59  The 
estimated expenditures grew to $200 million in 1976,60 and $436 
million by 1980.61  By 2002, this total grew to $3.3 billion.62  By 2005, 
it was estimated that county, state, and federal funding for indigent 
defense was approximately $4.1 billion,63 with state governments 
now assuming a majority of the financial responsibility for indigent 
defense.64  Although this seems like a tremendous amount of 
money, it translates into approximately $11.72 per person in the 
United States.65 
Currently, twenty-eight states essentially provide all the 
funding for indigent defense.66  Four additional states provide a 
majority of indigent defense funding.67  Sixteen states require 
counties to pay the majority,68 while two states provide no state 
 
 59. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 51.  County governments were 
responsible for approximately $50 million of the total expenditures.  Id. at 51 n.18 
(citing SHELDON KRANTZ, ET AL., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE 
MANDATE OF Argersinger v. Hamlin 5 (1976)) [hereinafter KRANTZ]. 
 60. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 51 (citing NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER 
ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES 7 (1976)). 
 61. Id. (citing NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: 
METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR 
ADEQUATE FINANCING 10 (ABA 1982)). 
 62. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 2. 
 63. Id.  Of this total, $1.777 billion was paid by states, $1.684 billion was paid 
by counties, and $668.8 million was paid by the federal government for indigent 
defense in federal court. See id. at 34–37. 
 64. Id. at 37. 
 65. Lefstein, supra note 9, at 921.  When expenditures for federal court were 
removed, it amounts to less than $10 per capita.  Id. at 922.  By comparison, in 
England, the per capita expenditure for indigent defense was almost $34 for the 
same time period.  Id. at 921.  Only five states spent more than $15 per capita on 
indigent defense, while twenty-nine spend less than $10 per capita.  Id. at 922. 
 66. Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 54. 
 67. Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.  Id. 
 68. Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and 
Washington.  Id.  Of these, six states contributed less than ten percent of the total 
funding—Arizona, California, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, and Washington. 
STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 35–37. 
14
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funding at all.69  Just as there was a general movement toward 
increased state oversight and administration of indigent defense 
services, there has been a corresponding increase of state financial 
responsibility.70 
Unfortunately, as states were assuming more responsibility for 
indigent defense, there were competing demands for limited state 
revenues.  As such, states have turned to alternative revenue 
sources to supplement general funds when allocating resources for 
indigent defense.71  These alternative sources have included 
reimbursements,72 application fees,73 filing fees and court costs, and 
various assessments on criminal files or fees.74 
Traditional reimbursement targeted defendants who were 
considered “indigent” but also had the financial means to pay for 
part of his or her legal defense.75  However, recovery often required 
a significant amount of administrative resources to try and collect 
from defendants upon completion of the case.76  
In the early 1990s, states were under both the pressure of 
budget deficits and legal challenges to the underfunding of 
indigent defense.  In an attempt to get a higher rate of return, 
 
 69. These states are Pennsylvania and Utah. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 
54. 
 70. Not only did states increase the amount they were contributing for 
indigent defense, but the number of states which contributed nothing decreased 
from ten in 1986 to two in 2005.  Id. at 55; STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, 
supra note 40, at 31. 
 71. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 57. 
 72. Also called recoupment, it is usually collected at the end of the case, 
and reflects the costs of the legal representative provided.  THE SPANGENBERG 
GROUP, PUBLIC DEFENDER APPLICATION FEES: 2001 UPDATE 2 (2002), available at 
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
pdapplicationfees2001-narrative.pdf [hereinafter APPLICATION FEES]. 
 73. Application fees are fees imposed at the onset of proceedings. Id.  They 
are also called “copayments,” “user fees,” “administrative fees,” or “registration 
fees.”  Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees 
for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2052 (2006).  Application 
fees can generally be broken down into two categories: (1) fees applied statewide, 
and (2) states where individual counties have the discretionary ability to impose 
and collect the fees.  See APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 5. 
 74. Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 16. 
 75. Wright & Logan, supra note 7373, at 2046. 
 76. Id.  Some recoupment programs spent more on administrative costs than 
they were able to recover. See APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 29 n.6.  Contrast 
this with Kentucky’s experience, which actually saw an increase in its recoupment 
collections after the imposition of application fees, resulting in $1.8 million in 
collections between the two sources for 2000.  Id. at 10. 
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many states supplemented reimbursement with application fees.77  
In 1994, application fees existed in only six states and one county.78  
By 1997, application fees were used by eleven states and seven 
counties within a twelfth state.79  By 2006, application fees were 
utilized by twenty-five states and two counties within a twenty-sixth 
state.80  Fees ranged from $10 to $480 depending upon the state, 
the charges, and the ability of the defendant to pay.81  However, 
despite the expansion of application fees, the revenue collected 
continued to fall far short of expectations.82 
 
 77. Wright & Logan, supra note 73, at 2046.  Copayments were often sought 
by leadership in indigent defense organizations in an attempt to avert budget 
problems.  Id. at 2055.  For example, a budget crisis in New Jersey in 1991 led 
directly to the imposition of a $50 application fee for indigent defense.  
APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72 , at 12.  In New Mexico, application fees were 
enacted at the request of the New Mexico State Public Defender in 1992.  Id. at 13. 
 78. APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 4. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Wright & Logan, supra note 73, at 2052.  These included Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and King County and Pierce 
County, Washington.  Id. at 2052 n.20–21. 
 81. Id. at 2053.  Florida is the only state which does not allow the waiver of an 
application fee.  See APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 8.  This is so despite the 
United States Supreme Court ruling that imposing an application fee 
unconstitutionally violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the 
defendant is required to pay and the payment would create a manifest financial 
hardship.  See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974); see also State v. Tennin, 674 
N.W.2d 403, 409–10 (Minn. 2004) (finding unconstitutional the same copayment 
statute once the legislature amended it to remove the court’s ability to waive 
copayments); State v. Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding constitutional a copayment imposed by the court as long as the court had 
the ability to waive it due to hardship).  
 82. See Wright & Logan, supra note 73, at 2070.  Collection of application fees 
ranged from only six to twenty percent.  APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 29.  In 
2001, only two states generated more than $1 million in application fees, and one 
of those was Florida, which appears to be imposing and collecting fees in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Id.  Indiana collected 
almost $1.5 million in 2000 through a combination of both application fees and 
recoupment.  Id. at 9.  Minnesota only generated $93,000 during the first three 
months of its nonwaivable application fee, even through the program was 
expected to generate $5 million each year.  Amy Sherman, Defendants Squeezed for 
Drug Tests, Probation Fees Are Part of Trend to Help Pay for Criminal Defense, PIONEER 
PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 27, 2003, at B1.  In South Carolina, an application 
fee expected to raise $1.4 million annually starting in 1994 never generated 
$200,000 in any given year.  APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 17–18.  Although 
Wisconsin estimated it would generate $7 million in application fees, through 
2000 it had failed to collect $1 million in any year since its enactment.  Id. at 20.  
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An additional avenue of revenue explored by states was 
surcharges on fines and other fees.  For example, Kentucky began 
assessing fees on DUI cases.83  South Carolina began imposing 
assessments on top of criminal fines.84  In Georgia, money was 
raised through fees on civil and criminal cases and surcharges on 
bail.85  In New York, nearly half of the money spent on indigent 
defense came from nongeneral fund sources.86  In Louisiana, the 
overwhelming majority of money for indigent defense is generated 
through fees associated by traffic fines.87  Capital cases and appeals 
 
Connecticut failed to generate close to fifty percent of anticipated revenue.  See id. 
at 6.  New Mexico hoped to earn as much as $200,000 annually, yet it was barely 
earning half that in 2000.  Id. at 13–14.  In Santa Barbara, California, the public 
defender fee was discontinued in 2001, in part because of the fact that the fee 
failed to generate significant revenue.  Id. at 22.  Nationwide, in 2001 the rate of 
collection for public defender fees was between six and twenty percent.  
Whitehurst, supra note 10, at 6. 
 83. APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 10.  Of the $200 DUI assessment, 
twenty-five percent of that collected went toward public defense.  Id.  In 1999, this 
generated almost $1.17 million for statewide indigent defense.  Id. 
 84. Id. at 17.  South Carolina has a complicated formula for fines from 
general court sessions, magistrates’ courts, and municipal courts.  Assessments on 
fines in each of these courts range from fifty-two to one hundred percent of the 
fines, with a portion of the collected assessments (ranging from 11.38% of 
magistrate assessments to 19.38% of municipal assessments) allocated for 
statewide indigent defense.  Id.  In 2000, these assessments on fines generated 
$5.67 million for indigent defense.  Id.  Other states acted along similar lines.  For 
example, in Ohio, counties are partially reimbursed by the state for indigent 
defense.  STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 25.  The 
reimbursement fund is supported primarily by assessments on criminal 
convictions.  Id.  South Dakota also uses a portion of a surcharge on fines to 
reimburse counties for a portion of the costs of indigent defense.  Id. at 28. 
 85. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 10.  These fees 
included civil filing fees as well as surcharges on fines and bonds.  Id.  All of the 
fees were specifically earmarked for indigent defense.  Id.  However, the additional 
assessments, started in 2004, were insufficient in covering Georgia’s costs.  JUSTICE 
DENIED, supra note 9, at 57. Money was diverted from the collection, so that in 
2009, indigent defense was only appropriated $40 million, even though $45 
million was raised in 2008 from the various fees.  Id. at 58.  From 2005 through 
2009, indigent defense in Georgia was shortchanged more than $20 million from 
collections initially earmarked for indigent defense.  See Bill Rankin, Georgia’s 
Public Defender System May Go Back Under County Control, THE ATLANTA J-CONST., Apr. 
6, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/georgias-public 
-defender-system-440964.html. 
 86. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 58–59.  These alternative sources of 
income included fees for criminal history checks, lifting license suspensions, 
surcharges on parking tickets, and additional attorney registration fees.  Id. at 59 
n.59. 
 87. Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at 1050; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 
58.  Unfortunately, in Louisiana the state provides less than twenty percent of the 
17
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in Mississippi are funded through assessments on criminal cases,88 
while all other cases are funded at the county level by fines in 
criminal cases.89  In Arizona, virtually all of the funding for indigent 
defense is provided by the county through various assessments and 
fees.90  Pennsylvania and Utah are the only states where indigent 
defense is funded entirely by the counties.91 
Despite the increase in both sources of revenue and total 
revenue, indigent defense budgets have continued to be cut during 
times of economic downturns.92  The pattern has held true during 
three major downturns in the past twenty years: early 1990s, early 
2000s, and 2008 to present.93 
Faced with budget deficits, some states started reducing public 
defense budgets in the early 1990s.94  In Kentucky, funding was 
reduced at the state level by over five percent.95 Similarly, spending 
for public defense in Tennessee was reduced by 5.3%.96  Tennessee 
attempted to deal with the budget reductions by reducing hourly 
 
financial assistance to indigent defense.  JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 58.  
Although a significant amount of money is raised at the parish level, the lack of 
state contributions left parishes financially vulnerable.  Some jurisdictions found 
themselves without the money to pay for attorney’s fees.  See State v. Citizen, 898 
So.2d 325, 338 (La. 2005) (noting that it is appropriate for the trial court to halt 
prosecution when there is insufficient funds to guarantee payment for the defense 
in a capital murder case); Backus & Marcus, supra note 9 at 1050 (discussing the 
negative balance for Lake Charles with six capital murder cases still outstanding). 
 88. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 17.  The 
assessments are on all criminal cases, including traffic tickets, fish and game 
violations, as well as traditional felonies and misdemeanors.  See id. at 18. 
 89. Id. at 17.  There is no tracking of money put into the general funds of 
each county, so it is impossible to track whether the fines collected at the local 
level are actually spent on indigent defense.  Id. at 18. 
 90. Id. at 5.  These assessments were on both criminal and civil cases, 
including traffic violations.  Id.  In addition, there was a surcharge on filing fees 
and an additional assessment on court fees.  Id.  Like Arizona, Nebraska and 
Washington are states that also relied upon surcharges and court fees to generate 
revenue for indigent defense.  Id. at 20, 32. 
 91. Id. at 27, 30.  Funding is left to each county to decide how to pay for 
indigent defense.  Id. 
 92. See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 93. See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 95. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Amendment: Thou Shall Not be Compelled to 
Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 363 n.1 (1993) (citing 
William R. Jones, Defense of Poor Crisis Needs Funding Help, THE ADVOC., Apr. 1992, at 
3).   
 96. Id. (citing John B. Arango, Tennessee Indigent Defense System in Crises, CRIM. 
JUST., Spring 1992, at 42). 
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remission for indigent defense to $5–$7.50 per hour.97  Kansas 
reduced by twelve percent the amount it would pay appointed 
lawyers for expenses and fees for indigent defense.98   
In the early 2000s, indigent defense budgets were once again 
under siege by state legislatures.  Funding for indigent defense in 
several states fell.99  In Alabama, costs for indigent defense rose 
while budget cuts ranged from ten to eighteen percent.100  In 
Georgia, statewide reform was enacted, but only $8.3 million in 
funding was provided even though the system required $50–$70 
million more to satisfy the mandated reform.101  In Kentucky, 
budget problems also gutted attempts at reform, leaving the 
indigent defense system woefully understaffed.102  In New Orleans, 
thirty-four of the forty-one public defenders were laid off in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.103 
From 2008 to 2010, states budgets were once again in dire 
financial straits.104  As a result, states and counties once again cut 
funding for indigent defense.  In Florida, many county public 
defender offices reduced positions and even transferred costs to 
 
 97. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 
17 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf, [hereinafter 
DEFENDER WORKLOADS].  
 98. Klein, supra note 95, at 372. 
 99. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 59.  These states included Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  In Oregon, $10.1 million 
was cut from the statewide Indigent Defense Account.  Lefstein, supra note 9, at 
856.  As a result, only the most serious crimes were prosecuted during the last 
three months of 2003 because of dramatic cuts in the indigent defense budget.  
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 11. 
 100. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 11. 
 101. Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, 
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 402 (2004) 
(citing Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Gets Force But Needs Funds, THE ATLANTA 
J.CONST., May 23, 2003, at F1). 
 102.   For example, heavy Kentucky caseloads led a panel of Kentucky state 
leaders to recommend hiring thirty-five additional lawyers; however, due to 
significant budget problems, that number was first reduced to ten additional 
lawyers, and then ultimately reduced to five additional lawyers—a whole thirty 
lawyers short of the original recommendation.  Lee, supra note 101, at 376 (citing 
John Cheves, Big Caseloads Swamp Public Defenders, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER 
(Nov. 24, 2002), http://www.uky.edu/SocialWork/courses/sw571-001/Caseloads-
Swamp-Defenders.pdf). 
 103. David Winkler-Schmit, The Life of a New Orleans Public Defender, GAMBIT, (Feb. 
21, 2009), http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A51258. 
 104. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 59.  For fiscal year 2009, thirty-seven states 
were looking at budget shortfalls, and of these thirty-seven, twenty-two fully funded 
their own indigent defense department.  Id.   
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defendants by requiring those convicted to pay a nominal fee or 
outright rejecting cases.105  In Kentucky, the state budget was 
reduced by $2.3 million.106  In Georgia, forty-one employees were 
laid off, and bills for contracted lawyers went unpaid.107  Successive 
budget cuts in the state of Maryland resulted in a reduction of ten 
percent of the workforce.108  In 2008, city and state contributions 
for indigent defense in New York City fell by $2.7 million.109 
 
 
 105. Id. at 60.  In Orange-Osceola County, budget reductions of $3 million 
resulted in the loss of ten attorney positions and forty positions over all.  Id.  In 
Miami-Dade County, the public defenders budget was reduced by 12.6%, but the 
workload climbed by twenty-nine percent.  Erik Eckhold, Citing Workload, Public 
Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&hp. 
 106. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 60.  Due to budget cuts, public defenders 
stopped handling conflict cases, some misdemeanors, and even probation and 
parole violations.  Id. (citation omitted).  The future does not look any brighter, 
and the Kentucky governor’s proposed budget calls for a $400,000 cut for fiscal 
year 2011, and another $400,000 in cuts for fiscal year 2012.  Ronnie Ellis, Public 
Defenders, KSP Plead for State Funding, MCCREARY CNTY. RECORD (Feb. 3, 2010), 
available at http://mccrearyrecord.com/statenews/x1512273178/Public-defenders
-KSP-plead-for-state-funding. 
 107. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 60.  In addition, the state of Georgia was 
unable to pay lawyers hundreds of thousands of dollars owed them for indigent 
defense in capital cases.  Id.  The reductions in Georgia’s state funding resulted in 
the dismantling of parts of the statewide public defender system created just five 
years previously.  Brenda Goodman, Plan to Cut Back Public Defenders Stirs Worry in 
Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06
/10/us/10defenders.html. 
 108. PAUL DEWOLFE, MD. PUB. DEFENDER, ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE 
APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY AND ADMINISTRATION 3 (2010), 
available at http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/agencies/operbudget/Documents
/2011/BudgetTestimony/C80B00_OfficePublicDefender.pdf.  The reductions, 
from 2007–10, constituted one hundred positions, including twenty-nine attorney 
positions.  Id. at 7.  In addition, during this three year time period, the lawyers 
were subject to mandatory furloughs.  Id.  Such furloughs reduced the amount of 
time each lawyer worked during the year, further increasing caseload pressures, 
and placing lawyers in the impossible bind of working for free or neglecting the 
needs of their clients.  Id. 
 109. Eckhold, supra note 105, at A1.  At the same time, the number of cases 
handled grew by 16,000.  Id.  On top of these cuts, there was an expected 
additional $11.3 million shortfall for the 2010 fiscal year.  John Eligon, State Law to 
Cap Public Defenders’ Caseloads, but Only in the City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at A19, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/nyregion/06defenders.html
?scp=1&sq=public%20defender%20caseloads&st=cse.   The 2011 New York City 
budget anticipates a drop of $20.1 million in city funding for indigent defense.  
LEGAL AID/INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., COMM. ON FIN. & COMM. ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SERVS. 2 (2010), available at http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs
/legal_aid_exec_rpt_fy_2011.pdf. 
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In 2009, the Montana Public Defender’s Office budget was cut 
by $800,000.110  In California, budget cuts and layoffs occurred in 
multiple counties.111  Meanwhile, Oregon was looking at a repeat of 
its 2003 crisis, facing the prospect of a 6.6% budget reduction in 
2009.112  Louisiana’s statewide indigent defense budget was cut by 
$1.4 million in 2009 and is facing an additional $7 million in state 
cuts for the upcoming budget.113  Oklahoma lost 7.5% of its budget 
in 2010, and is facing an additional 10% cut in 2011.114  Wisconsin 
was looking at a $2 million reduction from 2009 to 2011.115  
C. Translating Funding into Caseloads 
As discussed above, there has been a dramatic increase in 
funding for indigent defense, increasing twenty fold from 1976 to 
2005.116  Doesn’t this demonstrate that state and local governments 
have fulfilled their financial obligations created by Gideon and its 
 
 110. Jennifer McKee, Office of Public Defender Underfunded Already, HELENA 
INDEP. REC. (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.helenair.com/news/local
/govt-and-politics/article_fff78c74-1093-11df-a76a-001cc4c002e0.html.  The office 
was looking at an additional reduction of five percent of its budget, or $990,951 in 
2010 as the state legislature attempted to deal with its budget shortfall.  Id. 
 111. For example, the Sacramento County public defender’s office laid off 
eighteen staffers and was looking at laying off an additional twenty-nine attorneys 
due to budget problems in 2009.  Public Defenders Face Layoffs Across USA, USA 
TODAY (June 15, 2009), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation
/2009-06-15-lawyers-poor-layoffs_N.htm.  At the same time, the San Francisco 
public defender’s office was fighting to stave off a $2 million budget cut which 
would result in firing fifteen to twenty attorneys.  Id.   
 112. Jake Thomas, Lacking Lawyers: State Budget Cuts Threaten Public Defenders, 
PORTLAND MERCURY, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.portlandmercury.com
/portland/lacking-lawyers/Content?oid=1106650 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
 113. Winkler-Schmit, supra note 103.  In New Orleans, the city council cut 
additional allocations for public defense by $500,000, on top of state cuts, even 
though the number of charges filed had increased by over 1000 from the previous 
year.  Laura Maggi, N.O. Public Defenders Office Says It Will Refuse New Murder and 
Rape Cases Due to Council Budget Cuts, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2009/12/orleans_parish_public_defender
.html. 
 114. Julie Bisbee, Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Struggles to Survive Cuts, 
NEWSOK, Apr. 14, 2010, available at http://www.newsok.com/indigent-defense-system 
-struggles-to-survive-cuts/article/3453740. 
 115. WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, PUBLIC DEFENDER BUDGET (2009–11), 
available at www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/2009-11Budget/Governor/spd.pdf.  The 
numbers break down to a $618,000 reduction for 2009–10 and a $1.25 million 
reduction for 2010–11.  Id. 
 116. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. 
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progeny?  In short, no.117  The measure is not the total amount of 
money spent, but rather whether the amount of money spent 
ensures that every indigent defendant receives adequate legal 
counsel.118  Some form of caseload or workload measure is 
appropriate.119  
 
 
 
 
 
 117. Several factors contributed to the dramatic increase in cases where 
government lawyers needed to be provided for indigent defendants.  Some of 
these factors included: (1) increases in the crime rate and number of cases filed, 
in particular drug related cases; (2)  changes in economics, resulting in increased 
rates of people claiming to be indigent;  (3) increases in the percentage of serious 
felony cases; and (4) changes in sentencing policies including mandatory 
sentences.  THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE 
OF MINNESOTA BOARD OF PUBLIC DEFENSE 5–6 (1991) (draft report) [hereinafter 
WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY], available at www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/mandated
/090611.pdf.  It is estimated that as much as eighty percent of all criminal 
defendants receive the services of government lawyers.  Whitehurst, supra note 10, 
at 1 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 443, 452 (1997)). 
 118. The standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court is that a 
lawyer must provide a reasonable standard of care “under prevailing professional 
norms.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  To that end, the 
Court pointed to standards articulated by the American Bar Association as a guide 
to what was reasonable.  Id.   
According to the American Bar Association, any system must provide “effect[ive], 
efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal 
defendants who are unable to afford an attorney.”  A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON 
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER DELIVERY 
SYSTEM (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads
/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf.  Principle 5 specifically states 
“[d]efense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality 
representation.”  Id. at 2.  To that end, a lawyer’s caseload “should never be so 
large as to interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to the 
breach of ethical obligations . . . . National caseload standards should in no event 
be exceeded.”  Id.  Furthermore, while there has been considerable emphasis on 
building public defense programs, there has been no analysis about whether the 
public defenders can handle the caseload. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DEFENSE REFORM SINCE GIDEON: IMPROVING THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY BUILDING ON OUR SUCCESSES AND LEARNING FROM 
OUR FAILURES 18 (2008), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/NLADA
_PubDefLeadership.pdf. 
 119. DEFENDER WORKLOADS, supra note 97, at 7.  Although caseloads are 
important for establishing a standard, they cannot be looked at in a vacuum.  
Support staff, training, and supervision all are things which need to be considered, 
as well as caseloads when determining whether each individual attorney has the 
time and resources necessary to meet the needs of each client.  Id. 
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The first attempt to establish caseload maximums was in 1973, 
by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice and 
Goals (NAC).120  At that time the NAC determined that even under 
the best conditions, annual criminal defense attorney caseloads 
should not exceed the following: one hundred fifty felonies per 
year; four hundred misdemeanors per year; or two hundred 
juvenile cases per year.121  These standards were the maximum an 
attorney should handle if the attorney was doing only cases in one 
category.122  In the decades that followed, individual states tinkered 
with caseload maximums,123 although most of the standards 
established roughly mirror those established by the NAC.124  
 
 120. Id. at 8 (citing NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 
AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS (1973)). 
 121. Id. at 8 (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 
AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS 186 (1973)).  There are obvious limitations with 
establishing caseload maximums by category.  In addition to the issues of support 
staff, training, and supervision, there are also issues about waiting or travel time, 
professional development responsibilities, and the variance in time needed for 
various types of crimes within each category (for example, a simple theft case is 
treated no differently than a complicated murder or child sex abuse case).  Id. 
 122. Id. at 10. 
 123. Id. at 10–13.  Some states have established caseload maximums by statute.  
For example, Wisconsin has a specific maximum annual caseload spelled out by 
law.  Id. at 13–14 (citing WIS. STAT. § 977.08(5)(bn) (1999)).  Other states have 
statutory language calling for the creation of maximums, but defer either to the 
statewide public defender program (New Hampshire) or counties or cities 
(Washington State) to establish maximums.  Id. at 13 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 604-B:6 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.030 (1999)).  Other sources of 
caseload maximums include: “court rule, contractual terms, court opinion, and 
published guidelines by national organizations.”  Id. at 7.  In addition, several 
statewide public defender organizations have established caseload maximums 
based upon case weighted studies done to reflect the particularized circumstances 
in that state.  Id. at 8–9. 
 124. See id. at 11–12 for a comprehensive list of standards established relating 
to maximum caseloads for felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and appeals.  
For felonies, the standard maximums range from forty in Missouri to 302 in 
Tennessee, although both Missouri and Tennessee differentiate between the 
severity of the class of felonies.  Id.  In Minnesota, there is a cap of three homicides 
per year, but no distinction between all other types of felonies.  Id. at 12 n.4.  For 
misdemeanors, the range is a maximum of 250 per year in Minnesota (for gross 
misdemeanors, punishable by up to one year in jail) to 598 misdemeanors per year 
in Colorado (for nontraffic misdemeanors).  Id. at 11–12.  For juvenile cases, the 
range is 175 juvenile cases per year in Minnesota to 480 juvenile cases per year in 
Oregon.  Id.  Indiana has one set of standards based upon sufficient support staff 
and a lower maximum if support standards are not met.  Id. at 10.  If sufficient 
support staff exist, the standards are 200 felonies, 450 misdemeanors, 250 juvenile 
cases, or twenty-five appeals.  Id. at 11.  However, if there are not sufficient support 
staff, those maximums are lowered to 100–150 felonies, 300 misdemeanors, 200 
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Unfortunately, many of these established standards were ignored, 
and attorneys handled caseloads significantly higher than 
established ceilings.125 
Despite the significant increase in spending for indigent 
defense, caseload levels remain at dangerously high levels.126  For 
example, in 1991, public defenders in Knox County, Tennessee 
had caseloads as high as five times the national standards.127  In 
1992, public defenders in Dade County, Florida, were handling 
double the recommended number of juvenile cases.128  Meanwhile, 
in Connecticut, public defender caseloads were almost three times 
the recommended maximums in 1993 and 1994.129  The average 
caseload in Orange County, California in 1995 was 610 cases.130 
 
 
 
juvenile cases, or twenty appeals.  Id. at 10.  The ratio of necessary support staff 
included one paralegal for every four attorneys handling felony or juvenile cases 
(1:5 for misdemeanors), one investigator for every four attorneys handling 
felonies (1:6 for misdemeanors and juvenile cases), and one secretary for every 
four attorneys handling felonies (1:6 for misdemeanors, and 1:5 for juvenile 
cases).  Id. 
 125. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 67.  For example, even though the State 
of Washington had legislation requiring caseload maximums, many jurisdictions 
had caseloads far exceeding the established standards.  Lefstein, supra note 9, at 
854 (quoting MICHAEL S. SPEARMAN, REMARKS AT A HEARING ON LEGAL AID AND 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS: ARE WE KEEPING THE PROMISE?  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 40 
YEARS AFTER GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT (2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org
/public.nsf/GideonAnniversary/Index1/$FILE/Spearman_comments.pdf). 
 126. See Klein, supra note 95, at 393.  According to studies through the 1990s 
there was “an unmistakable trend showing that ‘caseloads of most public 
defenders [had] grown at an alarming rate.’”  Id.; SCOTT WALLACE & DAVID 
CARROLL, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, THE IMPLEMENTATION &  IMPACT OF 
INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS 5 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205023.pdf (noting that a survey of the one hundred largest 
counties in the United States indicated that average caseloads were over 530 cases 
annually, with some attorneys handling as many as 2000 adult cases or 1400 
juvenile cases in one year). 
 127. DEFENDER WORKLOADS, supra note 97, at 17.  Additional funds were 
obtained in 1992, almost doubling the size of the office.  Id.  However, in the years 
that followed, funding did not keep up, and by 1999 it was determined that fifty-
nine additional attorneys were needed statewide simply to reduce caseloads to the 
maximum recommended level.  Id. at 18. 
 128. Id. at 19. 
 129. Id. at 22.  Adult criminal lawyers were handling on average 1,045 
combined misdemeanors and lesser felonies, and juvenile criminal lawyers were 
handling 716 cases each per year.  Id.  
 130. See Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, 
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 377 (2004). 
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In the early 2000s, with budgets being reduced, caseloads once 
again soared to ridiculously high levels.131  For example, lawyers in 
Clark County, Nevada handled approximately 1500 juvenile cases 
each, about seven times the NAC recommended limit.132  In 
Kentucky, caseload averages rose to 489 cases per lawyer, with many 
jurisdictions averaging between 500–600, and one jurisdiction 
averaging over 600 cases per year. 133  Some parishes in Louisiana 
had caseload averages four to six times the recommended 
maximum.134  Some attorneys in the state of New York were 
handling between 1000 and 1600 cases annually.135 In Pennsylvania, 
a public defender’s office caseload doubled over twenty years 
without any increase in attorneys.136  Maryland public defender 
offices were so understaffed that by 2002, 300 full time lawyers were 
needed to reduce caseloads to the maximum levels.137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 131. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at 1055–59. 
 132. Id. at 1055. 
 133. Id. at 1057.  Rhode Island had similar numbers, with felony caseloads 
almost forty percent higher than the established maximums and misdemeanors 
150% higher.  GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 18.  Similarly, caseloads 
in Tennessee were at 670 cases in 1999, and the additional funding recommended 
to bring the state into compliance with caseload maximums was never allocated.  
White, supra note 9, at 537. 
 134. Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at 1058–59 (citing Editorial, Don’t Allow 
Justice to Derail, THE SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 6I; Elizabeth Fitch, Indigent 
Defenders Overloaded, Underfunded, NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La), May 5, 2005, at A1). 
 135. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 17.  Nebraska public defenders 
had similar experiences, handling 1200 cases, including felonies, misdemeanors, 
child support contempt cases, and juvenile cases.  Id. at 18.  In Berrien County, 
Michigan, six lawyers handled a total of 4479 felony and misdemeanor cases, with 
one lawyer handling 700 misdemeanors, 300 felonies, and 200 private cases on the 
side.  Duncan v. Michigan, 774 N.W.2d 89, 135 n.21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).  In 
Muskegon County, Michigan, one lawyer reportedly handled 700 felony cases per 
year. Id. 
 136. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 18. 
 137. Lefstein, supra note 9, at 855.  The Maryland public defender’s office had 
not had an increase in the number of attorneys for five years, despite dramatic 
caseload increases.  Id. 
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Not surprisingly, the budget crises in the late 2000s resulted in 
skyrocketing caseloads.138  In one county in Tennessee, six lawyers 
handled 10,000 misdemeanors in a one year period.139  In 
Kentucky, lawyers who were already operating forty percent above 
maximum caseloads and experiencing an eight percent annual 
increase in cases, were told by the legislature to expect budget 
decreases in upcoming years.140  In Dade County, Florida, budget 
cuts resulted in felony lawyers handling 500 cases per year, and 
misdemeanor attorneys handling 2225 annually,141 while in Dallas 
County, Texas, misdemeanor lawyers are expected to handle 1200 
cases while felony attorneys are expected to do 480 felonies 
annually.142  Average caseloads for Rhode Island were 1517 
 
 138. See Jeff Adachi, Budget Cuts Threaten Promise of Equal Justice, THE RECORDER 
(San Francisco), (Feb. 13, 2009), available at www.sfpublicdefender.org/media
/2009/04/budget-cuts-threaten-promise-of-equal-justice (noting that public 
defenders in Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland, and 
Tennessee all refused to accept new cases or sued to reduce excessive caseloads as 
budgets were reduced).  In some larger cities, notably Chicago, Atlanta, and 
Miami, some public defenders reported handling caseloads in excess of 2000 
misdemeanors annually.  ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN 
DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9 (2009) [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES], available at 
www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf. 
 139. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 68.  One attorney reported having open 
240 cases, of which 144 were felonies, while another lawyer reported representing 
151 clients in the months of January and February of 2008.  Id.  Two attorneys 
reported handling 3000 misdemeanors during a one year period.  MINOR CRIMES, 
supra note 138, at 21. 
 140. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 68; see Statement to the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Justice, Science & Related Agencies, of the U.S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
111th  Cong. 1–2 (2010) (statement of Virginia Sloan, President, The Constitution 
Project), available at www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/389.pdf (noting 
that despite the insufficient expenditure per case and high average number of 
cases, Kentucky’s Governor proposes reducing the Department’s budget). 
 141. Eckholm, supra note 105, at A1.  Although a district court judge initially 
granted the public defender’s request to refuse to take defendants charged with 
less serious felonies, an appellate court reversed the decision, instead referring the 
problem to the legislature.  See Bill Meyer, Public Defender Offices Are in Crisis 
Nationwide, CLEVELAND.COM (June 3, 2009), www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf
/2009/06/nationwide_public_defender_off.html.  Unfortunately, the legislative 
response repeatedly has been that indigent defense needs to learn how to better 
use its limited resources.  Eckholm, supra note 105, at A1.. 
 142. WESLEY SHACKELFORD, REVIEW OF DALLAS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER: 
APPELLATE DIVISION AND CASELOAD STANDARDS 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/pdf/Dallas%20PD%20Report-%20FINAL.pdf.  
These caseloads were established to insure that public defenders “remain cost 
effective vis-a-vis the private assigned counsel.”  Id. at 17.  The research indicated 
that the caseload caps were significantly higher than necessary to ensure “cost 
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misdemeanors and 239 felonies annually.143  In Missouri, cases 
increased statewide by 12,000 over an eight year period, and yet 
staff numbers remained unchanged.144  In New York City, the 
average indigent Legal Aid  Society lawyer handled almost 600 
cases in 2008.145 
Despite the significant increase in spending on indigent 
defense, overall the systems for providing indigent defense are 
inadequate.146  These problems are exacerbated when states face 
budget deficits.  So the question becomes: how can the 
constitutional right to counsel be insulated from the competing 
demands experienced by state and local governments during times 
of budget shortfalls? 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MINNESOTA 
In response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gideon, the Minnesota legislature passed the Public Defender Act in 
1965.147  The Public Defender Act allowed judges in each of the 
judicial districts to vote on establishing a public defender system.148  
However, the funding for indigent defense was the responsibility of 
individual counties, and was financed from property tax revenues.149  
 
effectiveness,” with public defender costs per misdemeanor at approximately half 
that of private assigned counsel and about eighty percent of the cost of assigned 
counsel on felony cases.  See id. 
 143. Talia Buford, R.I. Public Defender Looks to Lighten Load, THE PROVIDENCE J. 
(Apr. 20, 2009), available at www.projo.com/news/content/PUBLIC_DEFENDER
_REFUSES_CASES_04-20-09_HMDUF3_v38.35d5d5b.html.   
 144. Eckholm, supra note 105, at A1. 
 145. See Eligon, supra note 109, at A19.  While a new law would establish 
caseload maximums for New York City, it does nothing for other parts of the state 
of New York. “While the law applies only to lawyers who represent indigent 
defendants in New York City, supporters say they hope the guidelines will be 
expanded.”  Id.  The caseload maximums do not go into effect until 2010.  Id. 
 146. See Lefstein, supra note 9, at 845 (discussing the findings of the 
Department of Justice’s national symposia on indigent defense in 1999 and 2000).  
England spends more than three times as much per capita as the United States on 
indigent defense.  Id. at 921–23. 
 147. MINN. STAT. § 611.14–29 (2009). 
 148. JAIME BAILEY & MAREA BEEMAN, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, CASE STUDIES OF 
TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS:  MINNESOTA AND WYOMING 8 (2001) [hereinafter 
TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS], available at www.abanet.org/legalservices
/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/mn-wystudies.pdf; WEIGHTED CASELOAD 
STUDY, supra note 117, at 1.   Hennepin County and Ramsey County already had 
public defender systems in place prior to 1965.  TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 
supra note 148, at 8. 
 149. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996). 
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Consistent with national trends,150 in the early 1980s, Minnesota 
began to shift to a statewide system.151  In 1981, a State Board of 
Public Defense (the Board) was created.152  In 1987, the Board’s 
authorities were expanded,153 and in 1989 public defenders in the 
statewide system became responsible for all felony and gross 
misdemeanor representation throughout the state.154  In 1995, the 
state took over the responsibility for the funding and delivery of all 
indigent defense.155  Finally, as of January 1, 1999, the two 
metropolitan counties were folded into the statewide system,156 and 
public defenders became the primary providers of indigent defense 
statewide.157 
 
 150. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION REPORT: PUBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM 9 (2010) [hereinafter PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM], available at 
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/PED/pedrep/pubdef.pdf. 
 151. Id. at 10 (“About 20 years ago, Minnesota state government assumed 
responsibility for public defender services, shifting from a patchwork of local 
public defense systems.”). 
 152. Id. at 9.  The Board’s responsibility was primarily the appointment of the 
State Public Defender and the Chief Public Defenders in Minnesota’s ten judicial 
districts.  Id. at 10. 
 153. Among the responsibilities added to the Board in 1987 was the 
establishment of public defender caseload standards.  WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, 
supra note 117, at 1–2. 
 154. TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 148, at 8.  Among the changes 
in 1989 was the allocation of approximately $17 million for representation of all 
felonies and gross misdemeanors while misdemeanors, juveniles, and other cases 
remained the responsibility of the counties.  WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra 
note 117, at 3. 
 155. TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 148, at 8.  Under Minnesota 
law, public defenders shall provide services to those financially unable to obtain 
counsel for the following cases:  felonies, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors; 
appeals from convictions of felonies or gross misdemeanors or minors ten years of 
age or older entitled to counsel.  Id. at 8–9.  For juveniles, this includes anyone 
charged by delinquency petition with the commission of a felony or gross 
misdemeanor or charged with being delinquent and facing a potential out-of-
home placement.  MINN. STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 4 (2008).  It also includes 
children over ten in child protection cases where out-of-home placement may be 
ordered.  MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 3 (2008).  In addition, public defenders 
represented parents on child protection cases until 2008.  See MN to Lose 72 Public 
Defenders to Budget Cuts, WCCO.COM (June 5, 2008) (on file with author); see also 
infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 156. MINN. STAT. § 611.263 (1999).  Prior to 1999, public defenders in the 
Fourth Judicial District (Hennepin County) and Second Judicial District (Ramsey 
County) were county employees, while all the remaining public defenders were 
state employees. 
 157. The State Board of Public Defense provides some funding for four 
nonprofit public defense corporations which provide services to minority indigents 
in Minneapolis, St. Paul, Duluth, and the Leech Lake and White Earth Reservations.  
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When the state assumed responsibility for organizing indigent 
defense and providing services, it also took on the financial 
responsibility for indigent defense.158  From approximately $17 
million in 1989,159 state appropriations grew to almost $22 million 
in 1995.160  This number grew to $35 million in 1997,161 and $53.8 
million in 2003.162  For the next two years, state allocations dropped 
slightly, by approximately $200,000.163  Appropriations then 
increased again over the next several years, peaking at $68 million 
in 2009 before being reduced to $65.4 million in 2010.164  The  
 
PUB. DEF. BOARD, AGENCY PROFILE 1 (2008), available at http://www.leg.state.mn.us
/docs/2008/other/081000/public_defense.pdf. 
 158. Hennepin County continued to contribute for some of the costs of public 
defense, providing almost $2.7 million in 1994.  Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 
1, 4 (Minn. 1996). 
 159. WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra note 117, at 3.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. E-mail from Kevin Kajer, Chief Administrator, State Board of Public 
Defense, to author, attachment 1 (June 9, 2010, 15:44 CST) (on file with author).  
The legislature initially cut allocations to public defense by $3.4 million in FY 
2003.  PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 32.  As a result of the budget 
reductions, twenty positions were eliminated through retirement or layoffs.  Id. at 
33. 
 163. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162, attachment 1.   
 164. Id.  The initial recommendation by the governor was for a $5.1 million 
cut.  Scott Russell, Public Defenders: A Weakened But Indispensable Link, BENCH AND B. 
OF MINN., (2009), available at www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/feb09
/public_defenders.html.  There was a tremendous amount of support for the 
public defenders office.  For example, Michael Ford, President of the Minnesota 
State Bar Association, led a group lobbying on behalf of public defense funding.  
Id.  County Attorneys also publicly supported public defense funding.  See Susan 
Gaertner, Editorial, A Court System Starved Equals Justice Denied, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Apr. 8, 2009, available at www.startribune.com/opinion
/commentary/42706427.html (arguing against any additional cuts to public 
defense funding); Joy Powell, Dakota County Public Defenders Buried In Cases, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 1, 2009, available at http://www.startribune.com/local
/south/42258087.html (quoting Dakota County Attorney Jim Backstrom that 
public defenders are “‘woefully’ underfunded,” and that without more funding 
“our system of equal and fair justice for all will begin to erode”).  In addition, The 
Coalition to Preserve Minnesota’s Justice System was created.  It included 
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Eric Magnuson, district court judges, the 
President of the Minnesota State Bar Association, the County Attorneys 
Association, the City Attorneys Association, the Board of Public Defense, the 
Minnesota Sheriffs Association, the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, the 
League of Women Voters, ASFCME, and the Teamsters.  See The Coalition to Preserve 
Minnesota’s Justice System (on file with author); see also The Coalition to Preserve 
Minnesota's Justice System, Ramsey Cnty. Bar Ass'n, http://www.ramseybar.org
/courtfunding_coalition.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).  The coalition held 
press conferences, met with legislative leaders, and pushed for funding for all 
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budget allocation for 2011 calls for a further reduction to $64.7 
million,165 although larger cuts than that are likely given the 
anticipated $6 billion state budget deficit for FY 2011.166   
Minnesota law allowing for client reimbursement for attorney’s 
fees was enacted in 1965,167 and this law remained in effect when 
the state took over financial responsibility for indigent defense.168  
In an attempt to generate additional revenue, and consistent with 
national trends, in 2002 the Minnesota legislature established a $28 
public defender copayment.169  In 2003, in response to a budget 
deficit, the legislature made all copayments nonwaivable, and 
increased copayments to: $200 for a felony, $100 for a gross 
misdemeanor, $50 for a misdemeanor, $100 for a child in a 
juvenile case, and $200 for an adult in a child protection case.170  
Copayments returned to $28 after the 2003 changes were deemed 
 
justice system entities.  Id.  While it was able to minimize budget cuts to public 
defense, there were still significant reductions in public defense funding.  See Eric 
J. Magnuson, The State of the Judiciary, BENCH AND B. OF MINN., Aug. 10, 2010, 
available at http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/08/the-state-of-the-judiciary/ 
(explaining how the coalition worked hard to spread the word about justice system 
funding, but that resources still dwindled).  
 165. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162, attachment 1. 
 166. Baird Helgeson, Deep Cuts, Regardless of Outcome, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
July 25, 2010, at B1.  According to proposals articulated by the five major 
candidates for governor, cuts to state funding will range from $680 million to $8.4 
billion, and there is no indication public defense will be spared cuts under any 
candidate’s plan.  Id. 
 167. MINN. STAT. § 611.20 (1965).  Today, money collected through 
reimbursements are distributed to part-time public defenders to offset their 
overhead costs, and does not constitute additional money the Board of Public 
Defense can use to pay for additional attorneys or support the state.  PUBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 64–70 (discussing reimbursement in 
Minnesota and recommending that the law be changed to allow the Board of 
Public Defense “to use the funds as it sees fit”).  Consistent with the experiences of 
other states, reimbursement collections have not resulted in significant revenues, 
producing only $928,047 in the two year period of 2007–2009.  Id. at 67. 
 168. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.20 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (noting minor 
changes in the law in 1993, 1994, and 1995).  
 169. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (noting the addition 
of the $28 copayment in 2002); 2002 Minn. Laws 36. 
 170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2009); 2003 Minn. Laws 1402.  Of the 
money collected from copayments, the first $2.74 million was to be deposited in 
the general fund and any additional money was earmarked for the Board of Public 
Defense.  Id.  Minnesota only generated $93,000 during the first three months of 
its nonwaivable application fee, even though the program was expected to 
generate $5 million each year.  Amy Sherman, Defendants Squeezed for Drug Tests, 
Probation Fees Are Part of Trend to Help Pay for Criminal Defense, PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 
27, 2003, at B1.   
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unconstitutional.171  Finally, effective July 1, 2009, public defender 
copayments were raised to $75 per case, regardless of the type of 
case.172 
Despite the various plans to raise alternative revenue, public 
defense in Minnesota was funded entirely from legislative 
allocations from the general fund.173  However, in 2009, while once 
again facing a budget deficit, the Minnesota legislature authorized 
the Minnesota Supreme Court to increase attorney license fees as a 
way of generating additional resources for indigent defense.174  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed to temporarily raise attorney fees 
by $75 per year for a two-year period.175 
As a result of the budget cuts, the number of public defenders 
in Minnesota declined dramatically.  In March of 2007, for 
example, there were 423 full time equivalent (FTE) public 
defenders.176  By May of 2009, this number had decreased to 376 
FTEs,177 and by June 2010 it had been further reduced to 352 
FTEs.178 
Just as the massive increase in resources nationwide were 
insufficient to meet the needs of indigent defense, Minnesota’s 
budget increases, even in the times of state budget surpluses, have 
fallen far short of what was necessary to adequately fund indigent 
 
 171. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410 (Minn. 2004). 
 172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010).  Even with the 
increase in copayments, collections were modest, amounting to $499,000 in fiscal 
year 2009.  See e-mail from Rebecca Pirius, Legislative Analyst, Minnesota House of 
Representatives Research, to author (June 10, 2010) (on file with author). 
 173. PUB. DEF. BOARD, AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 157, at 1.  There are 
mandatory fines and various surcharges assessed to all fines in traffic and criminal 
cases, but these funds go into the general fund, with some amounts diverted to 
victim assistance programs or chemical dependency programs, depending upon 
the crime committed.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.101 (2008 & Supp. 2009) (discussing 
mandatory fines and the distribution of the collected fines); MINN. STAT. § 357.021 
subdiv. 7 (2008 & Supp. 2009) (discussing the distribution of mandatory 
surcharges to the general fund, peace officer training fund, and the Department 
of Natural Resources). 
 174. MINN. STAT. § 481.22 (Supp. 2009). 
 175. See Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, C1-81-1206 
(Minn. 2009), available at www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/supct/0911
/ORC1811206-1104.pdf.  The Court made it clear that it believed funding was the 
responsibility of the governor and the legislature, and was agreeing to a one-time 
fee because of “exceptional financial circumstances currently facing the courts and 
the state in general”.  Id. at 4. 
 176. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162, attachment 3. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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defense.  After the 1991 caseload review authorized by the 
legislature,179 the State Board of Public Defense established that a 
full time lawyer should handle no more than 100–150 felonies, 
250–300 gross misdemeanors, 400 misdemeanors, 80 child welfare 
cases, 175 juvenile cases, or 200 other cases annually.180 
Recognizing that most Minnesota public defenders handled a 
mixed caseload rather than simply doing misdemeanors or 
felonies, the State Board of Public Defense quantified the levels of 
effort associated with different types of cases by adopting the system 
of weighting cases based on the 1991 caseload review.181 A 
misdemeanor case was used as a standard unit, and all other cases 
were converted into units based upon the ratio of the maximum 
number of cases in that category versus misdemeanors.182  As a 
result, a felony case was assigned 2.67 units,183 a gross misdemeanor 
was 1.33 units,184 a child protection case was five units,185 and a 
juvenile delinquency was 2.29 units.186  An attorney’s weighted 
caseload was determined by adding up the units for each case 
handled during the year.  The caseload limits have not changed 
since they were adopted.187 
 
 179. See generally WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra note 117  (discussing the 
findings of the caseload study). 
 180. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1996); TWO INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 148, at 14 n.10 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, 
RECOMMENDED CASELOAD STANDARDS FOR DISTRICT PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN MINNESOTA 
(1991)).  The numbers adopted by the State Board of Public Defense differ from 
the recommendations made by the Spangenberg Group in two significant ways.  
First, the Spangenberg Group recommended that homicides be treated differently 
from all other felonies and that no lawyer handles more than three homicides per 
year if that was all the lawyer did for the year.  WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra 
note 117, at 70–71.  On top of that, the Spangenberg Group recommended 
capping felonies at 100–120 annually.  Id.  The State Board of Public Defense 
decided to treat homicides no different than all other felonies and to cap felonies 
at 100–150 cases annually.  Carlson, 544 N.W.2d at 4.  The Spangenberg 
recommendations were based upon sufficient support staff for the attorneys, 
including one legal secretary for every four lawyers, one investigator for every 
three felony lawyers or six lawyers handling other types of cases.  WEIGHTED 
CASELOAD STUDY, supra note 117, at 76–77. 
 181. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 28. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  at 29 n.9 (400/150 = 2.67). 
 184. Id. (400/300 = 1.33). 
 185. Id. (400/80 = 5). 
 186. Id. (400/175 = 2.29). 
 187. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 28.  Critics of the 1991 
caseload standards note that Minnesota’s criminal statutes and associated 
consequences have changed the nature of public defense.  Id. at 30.  “More 
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Regardless of budgetary limitations, public defenders cannot 
decline new clients.188  In 1991, attorneys in Hennepin County, 
Minnesota were handling caseloads fifty percent higher than the 
recommended maximums.189  This translated to a weighted 
caseload of 600.190  By 2001, the weighted caseload had risen to 864, 
and it was at 868 in 2003.191  By 2007, statewide weighted caseloads 
had fallen slightly to 748, still almost double the maximum 
caseload.192  The next year, caseloads dropped to 714 cases per 
lawyer,193 in large part because the State Board of Public Defense 
determined that public defenders would no longer represent 
parents in child protection cases.194  In 2009, even while refusing to 
handle the child protection cases, the weighted caseloads increased 
to an average of 779 per attorney.195 
One result of the crushing caseloads was that public defender 
offices stopped providing some services, even on the cases they 
were legally obligated to handle.  For example, in the First and 
 
complex cases and serious consequences” mean the amount of time each public 
defender needs to spend on each case goes up.  Id.  In addition, “collateral 
consequences” have increased, “includ[ing] denied access to public assistance or 
student loans . . . and loss of immigration status, jobs, or housing.”  Id. at 39. An 
increase in the number of clients who do not speak English or suffer from mental 
illness or chemical dependency has also significantly added to the amount of time 
spent on each case.  Id. at 40. 
 188. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 1996); Dziubak v. Mott, 503 
N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993) (noting that “a public defender may not reject a 
client, but is obligated to represent whomever is assigned to her or him, regardless 
of her or his current caseload . . .”). 
 189. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 5. 
 190. The state and national standard for weighted caseloads is a maximum of 
400 per attorney per year.  PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 35. 
 191. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162. 
 192. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 36.  It appears the weighted 
caseload numbers may actually underestimate caseloads of individual attorneys.  
The State Board counts all FTEs, even vacant positions it has no intention of 
filling.  Id. at 31.  As of May 2009, as many as twenty-two positions were vacant due 
to salary-saving leaves.  Id. at 33.  Because the vacant positions are not handling 
cases, the actual number of cases handled by lawyers may be significantly higher. 
 193. Id. at 36. 
 194. PUBLIC DEFENSE BOARD, supra note 157, at 9.  Although a parent is entitled 
to an attorney in a child protection case, the law does not require that the public 
defender’s office provide the attorney.  Id.  Rather, that financial obligation falls 
upon the individual counties.  See MINN. STAT. § 260C.331, subdiv. 3(4) (2008); In 
re Welfare of the Child of S.L.J., 772 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling 
that the county that commenced a termination of parental rights (TPR) case 
against an indigent parent was statutorily obligated to pay reasonable 
compensation to the parent’s appointed private attorney).  
 195. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 36. 
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Seventh Districts, public defenders stopped covering misdemeanor 
arraignment calendars.196  In the Fifth District, a waitlist was created 
for certain misdemeanor cases.197  The First and Fifth Districts also 
stopped staffing certain courts or court calendars.198  The situation 
became so bad that union members filed a grievance in the Third 
Judicial District.199  As a result, the weighted caseloads standard 
forced public defenders to represent clients in numbers far above 
national standards; they struggled to find the time and resources to 
devote to each case.200  To meet the state weighted caseloads 
standards, state spending would need to increase to approximately 
$108.4 million annually.201  With the projected $6 billion deficit 
looming on the horizon202 the likelihood of getting additional 
resources from the legislature is slim.203 
 
 
 196. Id. at 33–34.  These calendars were not covered, despite the fact that an 
arraignment calendar is considered a “critical stage” where the right to counsel 
attaches.  See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). 
 197. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 33. 
 198. Id.  This was especially true of drug courts, where many clients continue 
to appear in court as part of their period of probation.  Public defenders no 
longer appeared with these clients, unless there was a claim that the client violated 
the conditions of his or her probation and faced being sent to jail or prison.  See id. 
at 34. 
 199. Joy Powell, Stressed Public Defenders File Grievance, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
Apr. 12, 2010, available at www.startribune.com/local/90709914.html; Grievance 
with Respect to Excessive Attorney Workloads from Martha Albertson et al., to 
Karen Duncan, Chief Pub. Defender, Third Judicial Dist. (Mar. 5, 2010) (on file 
with author)..  According to the grievance, attorneys asked for caseload relief in 
2009 but continued to receive new cases.  Id. at 4.  As a result, lawyers are unable 
to have meaningful meetings with clients, prepare witness testimony at hearings, 
review discovery in a timely fashion, or honor client’s constitutional right to a 
speedy trial.  Id. at 5.  Public defenders lost cases they believe they could have won. 
Id. 
 200. See Grievance with Respect to Excessive Attorney Workloads, supra 199. 
 201. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162. 
 202. See sources cited supra notes 155, 157, and accompanying text (discussing 
the Minnesota budget shortfall and resulting impact on program allocations).  
 203. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 49.  As the Legislative Auditor 
noted, “[a]lthough we think adding more public defenders to the system would 
address many of the concerns we identified, the likelihood of substantial funding 
increases in the state’s current fiscal environment is small.”  Id.  See also White, 
supra note 9, at 545 (recognizing that as a result of political realities, adequate 
funding for indigent defense will remain problematic); Lefstein, supra note 9, at 
840 (stating “unless there are fundamental changes in this nation’s approach to 
providing defense services to the poor, the struggle to do so will continue 
indefinitely”). 
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V. DEDICATING THE REVENUE GENERATED FROM A FIVE-CENT TAX 
PER DRINK OF ALCOHOL TO PUBLIC DEFENSE WOULD MEET 
MINNESOTA’S CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
Minnesota has historically relied upon dedicated funding for 
particular uses.204  Some dedication of funds is spelled out in the 
Minnesota Constitution.205  Others are statutorily created by the 
legislature.206  In some cases, the legislature has empowered other 
governmental bodies to establish taxes for dedicated purposes.207  
Whatever the mechanism, Minnesotans have used dedicated 
funding sources to meet specific societal needs.  A dedicated 
funding source for public defense is necessary to protect those who 
cannot otherwise protect themselves through the political 
process.208 
 
 204. See generally MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (supporting the Environmental and 
National Resources Trust fund from proceeds from the state lottery); MINN. 
CONST. art. XI, § 15 (supporting the Outdoor Heritage Fund by a general sales tax 
increase); MINN. STAT. §§ 270.072–.078 (2010) (State Airports Fund); MINN. STAT. § 
287.12 (2010) (County Revenue Fund).  
 205. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (supporting the Environmental and 
National Resources Trust fund from proceeds from the state lottery); MINN. 
CONST. art. XI, § 15 (supporting the Outdoor Heritage Fund by a general sales tax 
increase); MINN. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 5, 12, 13 (supporting the Highway User Tax 
Fund by taxing motor vehicle and gasoline sales).    
 206. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 16A.724, 297I.05 (2010) (Health Care Access 
Fund); MINN. STAT. § 256.9658 (2010) (Heath Impact Fund); MINN. STAT. §§ 
270.072–.078 (2010) (State Airports Fund), MINN. STAT. § 287.12 (2010) (County 
Revenue Fund).   
 207. A recent example of this was the authorization that allowed Hennepin 
County to raise sales taxes to finance the building of the new Twins baseball 
stadium. MINN. STAT. § 473.757, subdivs. 10, 11 (2009). 
 208. Lee, supra note 101, at 404, 407 (noting that often “‘[l]egislatures, 
responding to voters fearful of crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources 
to the defense function rather than to additional police or prison space’” and in 
tough budgetary times “indigent defense is one of the first things to go”); Wright 
& Logan, supra note 73, at 2068 (quoting Robert Kennedy as stating “[t]he poor 
man charged with crime has no lobby”); Donald Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote 
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993) (concluding that legislatures routinely decline 
to uphold the rights of criminal defendants because “a far larger number of 
persons, of much greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a 
potential crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant”).  
According to a national survey, only six percent of respondents believed funding 
for indigent defense should be decreased.  BELDON, RUSSONELLO & STEWART, THE 
OPEN SOC’Y INST. &  NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL 
MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 7 (2001) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL MESSAGE], available at www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents
/1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf.  Despite general support for 
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Establishing a dedicated tax on alcohol would accomplish 
several goals.  Each one-cent tax per “drink”209 would generate 
approximately $25 million in revenue.210  As such, a $.05 tax per 
drink would generate more than enough to cover the $108.4 
million needed to fully fund public defense statewide.211 
The legislature has attempted to create user fees for public 
defense without much luck.212  While not everyone who drinks 
alcohol commits a crime,213 there has been a long accepted causal 
link between alcohol and crime.214  Studies from around the world 
demonstrate a positive correlation between high alcohol use and 
involvement in assaultive behavior,215 with some studies 
demonstrating alcohol involvement in as much as sixty-eight 
 
funding indigent defense, the calculus changes when the question is funding 
indigent defense versus other government programs, and as a result public 
defense budgets end up with an inadequate piece of the state funding pie.  See, 
e.g., id. at 7, 37.  
 209. For purposes of this tax, a “drink” is defined as 5 ounces of wine, 12 
ounces of beer, or 1.5 ounces of distilled spirits. E-mail from Nina Manzi, 
Legislative Analyst, Minn. House of Representatives Research, to author (June 3, 
2010, 12:01 PM CST) (on file with author). 
 210. Id. 
 211. There are numerous options for the $20 million annual surplus 
generated by the alcohol tax.  First, the money could be used for caseload relief so 
that attorneys are handling less than the maximum allowable number of cases.  
Second, the money could sit in the account so that it can be used to pay for future 
indigent defense needs.  Third, the additional money could be used to provide 
civil legal services for indigent clients.  See Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer 
Registration Fees, supra note 175, at 6 (increasing attorney license fees by $25 
annually to be allocated to the Legal Service Advisory Committee because civil 
legal services are dramatically underfunded).  Finally, excess revenue each year 
could be transferred to the general fund, much like the Health Care Access Fund.  
See MINN. STAT. § 16A.724 subdiv. 2(a) (2010). 
 212. See sources cited supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text. 
 213. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ALCOHOL AND 
CRIME 1 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ac.pdf. 
 214. See, e.g., Christopher Carpenter, Heavy Alcohol Use and Crime: Evidence from 
Underage Drunk Driving Laws, 50 J.L. & ECON. 539, 541 (2007), available at 
http://web.gsm.uci.edu/~kittc/CarpenterJLEZTCrime0906.pdf (stating “there is 
a causal role for heavy episodic alcohol use in the commission of nuisance and 
property crimes”); Susan E. Martin, The Links Between Alcohol, Crime, and the 
Criminal Justice System; Explanations, Evidence and Interventions, 10 AM. J. ON 
ADDICTIONS 136 (2001) (noting that “[h]undreds of articles and studies have 
shown that alcohol abuse is closely associated with violent and other criminal 
offenses”); Stephen Tomsen, Alcohol, Violent Crime, and Social Power, 1 AUSTL. INST. 
OF CRIMINOLOGY (1990), available at www.aic.gov.au/publications/previous
%20series/proceedings/1-27/~/media/publications/proceedings/01/tomsen.ashx. 
 215. Tomsen, supra note 214, at 2. 
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percent of assaults,216 sixty-seven percent of incidents of domestic 
violence,217 and almost half of all gun or knife attacks.218  Alcohol 
was also involved in about fifty to sixty-five percent of all sexual 
assaults and murders.219  Studies in the United States indicate that 
about forty percent of all people in prison, on parole, or on 
probation for violent crimes were using alcohol at the time they 
committed their crimes,220 and that alcohol played a role in the 
incarceration of 56.6% of all inmates.221  A more recent study for 
the state of Wyoming concluded that from 2006 to 2008, sixty-nine 
percent of all arrests involved alcohol.222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 216. Id. at 3 (citing B. Roslund & C. Larson, Crimes of Violence and Alcohol Abuse 
in Sweden, 14 INT’L J. ON ADDICTIONS 1103 (1979)).  One study indicated assault 
suspects consumed alcohol in as much as eighty-two percent of the cases.  Gary 
McClelland & Linda Teplin, Alcohol Intoxication and Violent Crime: Implications for 
Public Health Policy, 10 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 70, 71 (Supp. 2001). 
 217. GREENFELD, supra note 213, at v ; Tomsen, supra note 214, at 3 (citing C. 
Hamilton & J. Collins, The Role of Alcohol In Wife Beating and Child Abuse: A Review of 
The Literature, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 285 (J. Collins ed., 
1982)). 
 218. Tomsen, supra note 214, at 3 (citing NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME 
STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, 1974, 1977a, 1977b). 
 219. Sara Markowitz, Alcohol, Drugs and Violent Crime, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
20, 21 (2005) (citing J.R. Tinklenberg & F.M. Ochberg, Patterns of Adolescent Violent:  
A California Sample, in BIOBEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF AGGRESSION 121 (D.A. Hamberg 
& M.B. Trudeau eds., 1981); M.E. Wolfgang & R.B. Strohm, The Relationship 
Between Alcohol and Criminal Homicide, 17 Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 411 (1956)). 
 220. GREENFELD, supra note 213, at iii, 21.  The study also reports that over 
forty percent of murders involved alcohol, over thirty percent of sexual assaults 
involved alcohol, and nearly half of all assaults involved alcohol.  Id. at 21.   For 
public order crimes (DUI, weapons, commercial vice) seventy-five percent of all 
probationers used alcohol prior to the commission of their crimes.  Id. 
 221. The NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV., 
BEHIND BARS II:  SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2 (2010), 
available at www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/575-report2010behindbars2.pdf.  In 
addition to all people convicted of alcohol law violations, it included 51.6% of all 
drug offenders, 55.9% of all property offenders, 57.7% of all violent crime 
offenders, and 52% of all other offenders.  Id. 
 222. WYO. ASS’N OF SHERIFFS & CHIEFS OF POLICE, ALCOHOL &  CRIME IN 
WYOMING, 2006–2008, at 5  (2009), available at http://www.wascop.com/Alcohol
%20and%20Crime%20In%20Wyoming%202006-2008%20(2).pdf.  
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In addition, the average blood alcohol level at the time of the 
criminal activity ranged from .14 to .30.223  While studies could not 
conclude definitively that alcohol use increased the risk of violence, 
a review of the studies demonstrated that “offender populations 
usually were found to contain ‘heavy’ or ‘problem’ drinkers.”224 
While binge drinkers225 are only twenty percent of the 
population, they consume eighty-three percent of all the alcohol.226  
And, while frequent binge drinkers are only six percent of the 
population, they consume fifty percent of all alcohol in the United 
States.227  As such, a tax on alcohol would be paid primarily by those 
who abuse alcohol,228 many of whom end up in the criminal justice 
system.229 
In addition, increasing the cost of alcohol would have societal 
benefits.  Increasing the cost of alcohol may decrease crime.230  It 
 
 223. GREENFELD, supra note 213, at vii.  According to the estimates, the average 
blood alcohol level for all offenders who received probation was .16, while those 
who were in prison averaged .27.  Id.  Blood alcohol levels for violent crimes 
seemed to mirror these averages, while blood alcohol levels for property crime 
offenders were higher than the average, and blood alcohol levels for DUI and vice 
crimes were slightly lower than the overall average.  Id. 
 224. Id. at 2 (citing NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING 
VIOLENCE 184–85 (Albert J. Reiss & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., Nat’l Acad. Press 1993)).  
 225. A “binge” drinker is a person who drinks five or more drinks on one 
occasion.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DRINKING IN 
AMERICA:  MYTHS, REALITIES, AND PREVENTION POLICY 1 (1999) [hereinafter 
DRINKING IN AMERICA] available at http://breitlinks.com/alcoholawareness
/AlcAwarePDFs/DrinkinginAmerica.pdf.   
 226. Id. at 2. In Minnesota, binge drinkers made up approximately fifteen 
percent of the population. MINN. INST. OF PUB. HEALTH, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN 
SERVS., SUBSTANCE USE IN MINNESOTA A STATE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROFILE 51 (Mar. 
2009), available at http://docs.sumn.org/MNStateEpiProfile2009.pdf.  Of the 
population as a whole, 58.4% reported drinking within thirty days of being 
surveyed, leaving 41.6% of the population as not consuming alcohol on a regular 
basis.  Id. at 10.   
 227. DRINKING IN AMERICA, supra note 225, at 2.  According to an estimate by 
the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, in 2004 there were 17.6 
million people in the United States who either depended on alcohol or abused 
alcohol.  Alcohol and Crime, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP ON ALCOHOL MISUSE & CRIME, 
http://www.alcoholandcrime.org/npamc/issues/alcohol-and-crime (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2010).  
 228. DRINKING IN AMERICA, supra note 225, at 4 (stating that “the vast majority 
of Americans would feel little or no impact from a price increase because they do 
not drink or drink very little and infrequently”); Martin, supra note 214, at 148 
(noting that “much of the alcohol-related crime is the result of heavy drinking 
episodes of non-dependent drinkers”). 
 229. See supra Part IV and notes 217–218. 
 230. See Markowitz, supra note 219, at 24 (summarizing studies from across the 
world which appear to demonstrate that increased alcohol costs, including added 
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would also more accurately reflect the impact alcohol has on 
society.  Current taxes on alcohol are insufficient to compensate 
for the societal harm alcohol causes.231  For Minnesota in particular, 
alcohol tax generated $234 million in 2001, while alcohol use cost 
the state an estimated $4.5 billion.232  Enacting this tax and 
dedicating it to public defense would eliminate the need to support 
public defense with money from the general fund.  As a result, 
there would be an additional $65.4 million in the general fund to 
be used for other purposes. 
There is an indication that public support for increasing 
resources for indigent defense exists.  Fifty-seven percent of people 
surveyed nationwide believe that the states should guarantee 
indigent defendants a lawyer with a reasonable caseload.233  
Additionally, almost fifty-six percent of Minnesotans support paying 
 
alcohol tax, would result in lower rates of robbery, assault, and sexual assault).  In 
addition, Markowitz’s analysis indicated that an increase in beer tax would result 
in a decrease in assaults, but not sexual assaults and robberies.  Id. at 37–39.  See 
also Carpenter, supra note 214, at 4 (noting that reduction in alcohol use results in 
a decrease in nuisance and property crimes); Martin, supra note 214, at 150 
(noting that an increase in alcohol tax would result in a decrease in motor vehicle 
death and violence, and specifically reduce rapes, assaults, and robberies); Susan 
E. Martin et al., Trends in Alcohol Use, Cocaine Use, and Crime: 1989-1998,  34 J. DRUG 
ISSUES 333, 351–52 (2004) (noting that a reduction in alcohol availability and 
misuse will decrease crime rates, particularly violent crimes). 
 231. For every $1 in taxes on alcohol or tobacco raised for state and federal 
coffers, government spends $8.95 for the consequences of smoking and alcohol 
abuse.  NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV., SHOVELING 
UP II:  THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS iii 
(2009), available at www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/380-ShovelingUpII.pdf.  In 
2005, federal spending as a result of alcohol abuse and addiction was $238.2 
billion, state spending was $135.8 billion, and local government spending was 
$93.8 billion.  Id. at 2.  This constituted 10.7% of all government spending in the 
United States.  Id. at i.  At the same time, federal, state, and local taxes on alcohol 
generated only $14.0 billion in 2005.  Id. at 4.   
 232. MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COST OF ALCOHOL 
USE IN MINNESOTA 1 (2004), available at www.health.state.mn.us/cdrr/alcohol
/alcpdf/final2004costfactsheet.pdf. 
 233. NATIONAL MESSAGE, supra note 208, at 5.  The specific question asked:   
Please tell if you think each of the things in the list should be guaranteed 
by the government to low-income people accused of a crime, is important 
but should not be guaranteed, is not very important, or is not at all 
important for someone accused of a crime. . . .  A lawyer with a small 
enough case load to provide the time necessary to prepare a defense for 
each person. 
Id. at 42.  Thirty-seven percent of those surveyed indicated that it was important 
but not a right.  Id.   It is also worthy to note that sixty-four percent of people 
surveyed supported using taxpayer dollars for indigent defense.  Id. at 4. 
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additional fees on alcohol to help offset some of the costs of 
alcohol to the state, such as health and safety.234  A modest $.05 tax 
per drink would guarantee adequate indigent defense while 
reducing some of the impact alcohol abuse has on the state’s 
general fund. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the half-century since Gideon v. Wainwright, legislatures in 
every state have failed to protect the constitutional right to a 
lawyer.235  Even in times of economic prosperity, funding for 
indigent defense has fallen short.  In times of budget shortfalls, 
budgets for indigent defense have been slashed.236  As a result, 
lawyers representing poor defendants have struggled with 
untenable caseloads to provide competent representation for their 
clients.237  One way to protect budgets from the feeding frenzy 
during times of budget shortfalls is to have a dedicated funding 
source.  The funding to ensure the constitutional right to counsel 
would no longer be forced to compete against popular programs or 
services.   
The failure to adequately fund indigent defense hurts all of us.  
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the 
underfunding of legal services for indigent clients has resulted in 
the suffering of the court system as a whole.238  It undermines 
confidence in the justice system, congests the courts, and increases 
the likelihood of innocent people being convicted.  As former U.S. 
Attorney General Janet Reno stated, “Our criminal justice system is 
interdependent: if one leg of the system is weaker than the others, 
the whole system will ultimately falter.”239  By using a nominal tax 
on alcohol, sufficient revenue could be generated to benefit all 
Minnesotans, as well as to insure that equal justice exists for all, 
regardless of economic background.   
 
 234. MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, STATE FAIR POLL RESULTS 2 (2006), 
available at www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hinfo/Fair/2006Results.pdf. 
 235. See supra Part II. 
 236. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra Part II.C. 
 238. Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, supra note 175, 
at 6. 
 239. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS: 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE xiii (1999), available at 
www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf. 
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